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Years of Sheff v. O’Neill  
JUSTIN R. LONG 
 
Professor Lani Guinier and others have recently developed a theory 
called “demosprudence” that explains the democracy-enhancing potential 
of certain types of U.S. Supreme Court dissents.  Separately, state 
constitutionalists have described state constitutions’ capacity to offer a 
base of resistance against the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow conception of 
individual rights.  Applying these two seemingly unrelated theories to 
school desegregation litigation in Connecticut and to same-sex marriage 
litigation in Iowa, this Essay suggests that certain state constitutional 
decisions might function like U.S. Supreme Court dissents to enhance 
democratic activism.  In this way, interactive federalism might usefully 
serve as a category of demosprudence. 
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Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty 
Years of Sheff v. O’Neill 
JUSTIN R. LONG* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, civil rights lawyers sued state officials on behalf of 
school children in Hartford, Connecticut, complaining that the nearly all-
white suburban schools and nearly all-minority city schools violated the 
state constitution.  The lawyers sued in court because state politicians 
seemed not to be responding to the de facto segregation.  Rather than fight 
what looked like a futile political campaign, a lawsuit could compel the 
desegregation Hartford children needed.  The lawyers sued under the state 
constitution because they knew that the U.S. Supreme Court was steadily 
withdrawing the courts from their historic role in school desegregation.  
The Connecticut Constitution and courts could avoid this federal 
retrenchment.  In this way, both law and politics were causes of the 
landmark Sheff v. O’Neill1 case, and both legal and political change were 
its goals.  But constitutional theorists, however, have struggled with how to 
reconcile law and politics in a principled fashion.2  If our nation is a 
democracy, what legitimacy can there be for counter-majoritarian law?  If 
we are subject to the rule of law, what room is left for popular will? 
Lani Guinier’s recently developed idea of “demosprudence” offers a 
new way of thinking about the law/politics divide.  Guinier argues that 
certain kinds of judicial decisions, and dissents in particular, can inspire 
popular responses in the form of social and political activism.  These 
political activities can, in turn, affect judges’ understanding of fundamental 
constitutional norms.  In this way, there is an ongoing national debate 
about the meaning of the most important values embedded in the federal 
Constitution.  U.S. Supreme Court opinions are not merely politics by 
another means, nor are politics merely parallel to legal interpretation.  
Instead, both judicial and social activity together comprise a broader 
conversation about the interpretation of the core constitutional values 
                                                                                                                          
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  A.B., Harvard College; 
J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law.  I thank Michael Fischl, Rick Kay, Bob Williams, the 
participants in the University of Connecticut School of Law faculty workshop series, and Ariana 
Silverman for helpful comments. 
1 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996) (declaring unconstitutional state statutes responsible for de 
facto school segregation). 
2 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Professor & Dean of Stanford Law School, “The Interest of the 
Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, in 41 
VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 699–700 (2006) (describing the difficulty and importance of distinguishing 
between law and politics). 
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underlying our democracy.3 
Meanwhile, Paul Kahn,4 James Gardner,5 Robert Schapiro,6 and other 
state constitutional scholars7 have persuasively argued that state 
constitutional jurisprudence can usefully function as a site of resistance to 
federal constitutional interpretations, a theory known as “interactive 
federalism.”8  If the U.S. Supreme Court fails to protect such rights as 
privacy, marriage equality, or public education under the federal 
Constitution, state high courts may, and often do, provide a competing 
constitutional vision that does protect those liberties.  Although the states’ 
more expansive protection of civil rights formally derives from the state 
constitutions, interactive federalism suggests that the true debate 
underlying these decisions is a dispute about the basic values we share as 
Americans.  State constitutionalism, in this view, can and should function 
as a legal space for contesting the dominant federal interpretation of 
national norms.  Furthermore, state constitutional jurisprudence can 
galvanize a popular political response that leads either to changes in 
federal jurisprudence or to new legislative action.9 
This Essay suggests a previously overlooked link between the theories 
of demosprudence and interactive federalism.  Using the example of Sheff 
v. O’Neill, this Essay asks, “Can state constitutional decisions function as 
demosprudential dissents?”  Preliminary analysis of the Sheff litigation and 
same-sex marriage litigation suggests that scholars of demosprudence and 
state constitutionalism have much to learn from each other.  Imagining 
state constitutional decisions as demosprudential dissents offers a new 
perspective on federal and state constitutional theory, and potentially offers 
a democracy-enhancing justification for American federalism. 
II.  DEMOSPRUDENCE 
Professor Guinier’s far-reaching insight is that U.S. Supreme Court 
dissents can be effective beyond merely persuading some as-yet unseated 
                                                                                                                          
3 See Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–18, 
58–59 (2008) (discussing how dissenting opinions are illustrative of this theory). 
4 See Paul Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1147, 1148 (1993) (rejecting a separate-spheres approach to federalism). 
5 See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE 
OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (Univ. of Chi. Press 2005). 
6 See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Univ. of Chi. Press 2009); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of 
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005) (providing a useful background and historical 
evaluation of this philosophy). 
7 See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial 
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 95 (2000) (describing state constitutional interpretation as 
legitimately reactive to federal constitutional law). 
8 Id. 
9 E.g., id. at 298. 
 2009] DEMOSPRUDENCE, INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM 589 
Court majority to overturn the disfavored decision in the misty future.10  
Rather, as Robert Williams pointed out in 1984, the Justices’ dissents can, 
and sometimes do, address contemporary political forces.11  By inspiring, 
comforting, and teaching common people affected by the Court’s opinion, 
dissents can reach past legal elites to provoke democratic engagement and 
change.12 
Guinier identifies three defining characteristics of the demosprudential 
dissent: substantively, the dissent is about a basic issue of democracy; 
stylistically, the dissent is written with a tone and structure that address a 
broader audience than the legal in-crowd; and procedurally, the dissent 
challenges that broader audience to exercise popular sovereignty by 
counteracting the majority opinion.13  Guinier points out that part of the 
populism-provoking capacity of the demosprudential dissent comes from 
its partial-outsider status.  The dissent is conducive to popular inspiration 
in part because it lacks the compelling power of the state behind it; dissents 
establish no precedent and justify no legal violence.  Instead, dissents 
inherently offer a challenge to the prevailing legal norm and an alternative 
to the state’s use of force to carry out that norm.  Dissents, like the socio-
political action they hope to provoke, are an act of resistance.14 
By describing an imagined alternative to the legal world defined by the 
majority opinion, and by drawing ordinary people into sharing the 
dissenter’s vision, dissents protect what Robert Cover called the 
“jurisgenerative” features of communal life.15  Justices accomplish this, 
Guinier suggests, by writing directly to the public (or affected segments of 
it) in language that avoids dry, cold legalisms in favor of emotional appeals 
to common national values.  The best demosprudential dissents attend to 
“the premises behind the logic, the stories and not just the explanations” 
underlying the Court’s constitutional hermeneutics.16  In doing so, they 
welcomeperhaps “authorize”everyday folk to oppose the Court’s 
                                                                                                                          
10 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 50–51 (“Simply by contesting the view of the Court 
majority, the dissenter may reveal a more transparent deliberative process of lawmaking.”). 
11 See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of 
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35. S.C. L. REV. 353, 375 (1984) (noting the influence of U.S. 
Supreme Court dissents on Congressand state courts); see also Robert Post, Law Professors and 
Political Scientists: Observations on the Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 581, 582 (2009) (describing the significance of Guinier’s theory as its placement of 
judges within, rather than apart from, democratic deliberation). 
12 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 15–16 (explaining that dissents sometimes focus on 
“enhancing . . . democratic potential” rather than reasoning through traditional legal forms). 
13 See id. at 49 (describing the elements of a demosprudential dissent). 
14 See id. at 48–49 (noting that dissents challenge, rather than exercise, the law’s coercive power). 
15 See Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 539, 544–45 (2009) (citing Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1983)) (describing demosprudential dissents as a method of cooperation between legal elites 
and ordinary people). 
16 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 11, 13 (describing a Justice Breyer dissent). 
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conclusion.17 
In contrast, conventional constitutional thought suggests that U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions end the debate about the fundamental norms at 
stake in the decided case; it is for this reason that advocates of judicial 
minimalism urge the Court to avoid reaching these profound questions.18  
For reasons of popular sovereignty, Larry Kramer seems appalled19 by the 
way that Supreme Court decisions exhibit the “jurispathic” 
tendenciesthe killing of ongoing popular debate about the meaning(s) of 
fundamental social values as embodied in lawthat Professor Cover 
described.20  Demosprudence offers a path toward revival of alternative, 
non-statist nomoi and narratives because it reminds us that court law and 
folk law are articulated, just as the leg bone is connected to the hip bone.  
We the People occasionally find sufficient inspiration in judicial dissents, 
like Justice Ginsburg’s in Ledbetter21 or Justice Breyer’s in Parents 
Involved,22 to take up the colors and recapture the legal battlements.  As 
new scholarship from Jason Mazzone confirms,23 the Court speaks, but it 
lacks the last word. 
Unfortunately, the orality of dissents from the bench attracts Guinier’s 
attention as particularly promising for democratic engagement.24  “The 
idea,” she argues, “is that speech is primary, present, natural, interior, real, 
authentic, and whole, and writing is secondary, artificial, exterior, a 
representation of speech, a substitute for speech, removed from reality, a 
subversion or corruption of the original speech.”25  Even if true, the near-
total unavailability of U.S. Supreme Court dissents from the bench makes 
                                                                                                                          
17 See Timothy R. Johnson et al., Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to 
Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1560, 1581 (2009) (explaining that oral dissents “signal 
litigants and other actors . . . that the [Court’s] decision is a bad one and someone must act to change 
it”). 
18 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REV. 123, 128 (2005) 
(arguing that “the argument for minimalism is strongest in an identifiable class of cases: those in which 
American society is morally divided, those in which the Court is not confident that it knows the right 
answer, and those in which the citizenry is likely to profit from more sustained debate and reflection”). 
19 See Kramer, supra note 2, at 697 (complaining that lawyers and lay people alike assume 
without real question that the U.S. Supreme Court has sole interpretative authority over the federal 
Constitution). 
20 See Cover, supra note 15, at 53 (describing state-backed law as tending to destroy all 
competing legal norms). 
21 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2009). 
22 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  At the time of publication, this case had not been published in the U.S. 
Reporter. 
23 See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretive authority has elided into 
that of the state courts). 
24 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 26–27 (emphasizing the special significance of spoken 
dissents). 
25 Id. at 27. 
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them poor candidates, at present, for democratic engagement.26  However, 
Guinier’s distinction between oral and written dissents may be somewhat 
hyperbolic.  A Justice who authored a stirring written dissent but declined 
to read it aloud might be forgiven for concluding, like the poet, that 
“Between my finger and my thumb/ The squat pen rests./ I’ll dig with it.”27  
Applying Guinier’s concept of demosprudence to written dissents seems to 
sacrifice little of the theory’s descriptive and normative power. 
Critics of demosprudence theory notably include the political scientist 
Gerald Rosenberg.  He argues that the theory, although an effort to link the 
Court with democratic deliberation and with the popular legitimacy such 
deliberation would provide, hinges on wildly misplaced optimism about 
how much the public knows or cares about the Supreme Court’s work.28  
For Professor Rosenberg, legal elites’ concentrated gaze on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, even when purporting to study grassroots activism, reveals 
a blind romanticism.  Rosenberg argues that demosprudence imprudently 
ignores the institutions of popular politics, the majoritarian venues through 
which democratic deliberation really happens.29 
In rebuttal, Robert Post points out that precious few members of the 
public could identify congressional leaders or the faceless activists who toil 
on party platforms, either, yet those politicians’ importance to how 
American popular government works appears beyond cavil.  This is 
because, Post suggests, deliberative democracy operates more through 
public debate and communal relationships than through the measurable 
results of superficial shifts in public-opinion polls.30  Indeed, Guinier’s 
understanding of demosprudence explicitly depends on this subtler (yet 
more profound) concept of politics.31 
Beyond defending Guinier’s development of demosprudential theory, 
Professor Post, with Reva Siegel, has also recently contributed to the 
literature on the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and 
democratic action.  They explain that political backlash to U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions, often viewed with dismay by juriscentric legal elites, 
actually exhibits the mutually influential relationship between grassroots 
                                                                                                                          
26 See Frederick C. Harris, Specifying the Mechanism Linking Dissent to Action, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
605, 607 (2009) (noting that the possibility of oral dissents provoking grassroots action is hampered by 
the public’s lack of access to these spoken texts). 
27 SEAMUS HEANEY, Digging, reprinted in NEW SELECTED POEMS: 1966–1987, at 2 (1990). 
28 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 563, 564 (2009) (arguing that 
ordinary people simply do not know about the Court’s opinions and that even elites care only about the 
holdings, not the Justices’ reasoning or rhetoric).  But see Dion Farganis, Does Reasoning Matter?  The 
Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy (July 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434726 (arguing that the reasoning in a Supreme Court opinion 
does affect how a lay reader perceives the opinion’s legitimacy). 
29 Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 564. 
30 See Post, supra note 11, at 583–85 (2009) (rejecting Rosenberg’s reliance on observable and 
quantifiable factors as the sole determinants of political significance). 
31 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining that the goal of demosprudential 
dissenters is not necessarily a shift in voting percentages, but a shift in public normative discourse). 
 592 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:585 
 
politics and Court decisions.32  This connection offers the Supreme Court a 
measure of democratic legitimacy that helps it escape the charge that its 
countermajoritarian power undermines popular sovereignty.33  Backlash, 
though obviously undesirable to the Justices whose interpretations face 
public rejection, potentially strengthens rather than weakens the Court as a 
crafter of nomos.34  And how do the Court’s opinions engage the ordinary 
people who then respond politically?  Post argues that the Justices use the 
“familiar techniques” we recognize in demosprudence theory: a 
combination of both standard legal reasoning and emotional rhetoric to 
inspire and persuade.35 
III.  INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM 
The new scholarship on demosprudence has focused exclusively on the 
role of the U.S. Supreme Court in engaging grassroots democracy, to the 
exclusion of state courts (or, indeed, of states at all).  Similarly, the best 
recent scholarship on state constitutionalism has largely overlooked the 
relationship between courts and ordinary people in constitutional 
interpretation, in favor of scrupulous attention to the dialogue between 
state high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.  The most prominent 
exception, Douglas Reed’s 1999 article,36 links state constitutions to 
popular democracy, but treats the interaction between state constitutional 
interpretation and political forces as internal to each state.  Nevertheless, 
the state constitutionalists’ theory of federalism amply rewards careful 
study. 
James Gardner’s path-breaking book, Interpreting State 
Constitutions,37 proposes an elegant solution to a problem that has vexed 
state high courts and their academic observers since Justice Brennan’s 
famous call for state constitutional interpretation independent of federal 
precedent.38  The difficulty is that many state constitutions include rights 
provisions worded identically (or close enough) to corresponding 
provisions in the federal Constitution; what might legitimate a state court 
                                                                                                                          
32 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 390–91 (2007) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court decisions can provoke a 
backlash that consists of ordinary people debating constitutional meaning and acting on their legal 
understanding). 
33 See id. at 383 (arguing that one reason for popular loyalty to the Supreme Court is its potential 
responsiveness to democratic demands). 
34 See id. at 395 (suggesting that backlash might be essential to retaining the democratic 
legitimacy of judicial opinions). 
35 Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CAL. L. REV. 429, 441 
(1998). 
36 Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional 
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 874–75 (1999). 
37 See generally GARDNER, supra note 5. 
38 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L REV. 489, 491 (1977) (calling for state courts to interpret their state constitutions as more 
rights-protective than federal constitutional jurisprudence). 
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in giving such a provision any meaning other than the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s authoritative interpretation?39  Professor Gardner’s functional 
approach positions states as competitors to the national government for the 
People’s trust and affection.40  Like Lawrence Friedman’s earlier work,41 
Gardner’s theory suggests that state courts should unabashedly consider 
such matching clauses as an invitation to check and balance the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence.42  The beneficiaries of this 
interpretive redundancy are the People themselves, Gardner maintains.43  If 
either the state or federal high court protects individual liberty 
insufficiently, the other stands ready to fill the breach.44 
Gardner concedes, as he must, that states have frequently been on the 
wrong side of the state-federal competition to protect individual liberty.45  
But state constitutions offer state high courts at least the capacity to 
consider both intrastate domestic arrangements and the relationship 
between the state and federal governments.  Gardner’s larger challenge lies 
in explaining what nomos authorizes independent state interpretation.  In 
no uncertain terms, Gardner has steadily rejected the search for an 
independent state “character” that might provide a normative community 
sufficient to justify constitutional interpretation.46  Instead, Gardner 
reminds us that state citizens are national citizens, too, and that state 
constitutions exist in a legal universe premised on a federalism prescribed 
                                                                                                                          
39 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 96–97 (noting that independent interpretation of state 
constitutional clauses parallel to federal constitutional clauses has attracted criticism as result-oriented 
judicial activism). 
40 See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 125–26 (emphasizing the role of states as a protection for 
individuals against overreaching national power, and vice versa). 
41 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 97 (arguing that autonomous state constitutional interpretation 
can provide a useful protection against inadequate U.S. Supreme Court rights protection). 
42 See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 254–55 (explaining that matching constitutional provisions 
invite the state high court to react to U.S. Supreme Court doctrine and resist the federal interpretation 
where appropriate). 
43 See id. at 256 (discussing the importance of different levels of government being able to act 
independently in the best interests of the people). 
44 See id. at 254–55 (noting that the same provision in state and federal constitutions can best 
serve the people as interpreted by the respective state and federal authorities). 
45 See id. at 135 (noting that states have historically posed an even greater threat to individual 
liberty than the federal government); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of 
American Federalism: Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 666–67 (2005–06) 
(describing the states’ rabid red-baiting and oppressive speech restrictions, above and beyond the 
national effort, during World War I and the McCarthy era). 
46 See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 231–32 (emphasizing that state citizens derive their political 
identity from their concurrent status as national citizens); James A. Gardner, Southern Character, 
Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional 
Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1291 (1998) (empirically attacking the argument that state 
constitutions reflect unique state values or character).  For the view that federalism is only justified 
where the subnational units do express a deep set of norms distinct from national values, see MALCOLM 
M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC COMPROMISE 60–61 
(2008). 
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by the national Constitution.47  Therefore, Gardner implies that the national 
character and national values provide the normative foundation for state 
constitutional interpretation. 
Robert Schapiro, like Gardner, accepts the implausibility of founding 
autonomous state constitutionalism on unique state “character.”48  Rather 
than looking toward a national nomos, however, Professor Schapiro 
decouples state constitutions from actual communities of value.  Instead, 
he argues that state constitutions contain, in the texts themselves, all of the 
normative foundation an interpreter might need.  For Schapiro, it is the 
imagined, aspirational nomos described (or implied) in the constitutional 
text that ought to drive constitutional interpretation, not any actual or 
perceived normative community in the real world.49  Schapiro’s concept is 
especially useful as a justification for counter-majoritarian state 
constitutional interpretation; the judicial result may not comport with the 
values of the state’s actual population, but it reflects the fundamental 
values fixed in the text.50  Implicit in this aspect of Schapiro’s theory lies 
the central idea that law can influence the ordinary person’s understanding 
of constitutional values: if the state court’s mediation of the constitutional 
words into actual law could not move the state polity toward the 
constitutional aspirations, then the law’s violence would be futile and 
cruel. 
Even though autonomous state constitutional interpretation derives 
justification from each state’s particular constitutional text, Schapiro’s later 
work emphasizes that states are not stand-alone entities.  Rather, state and 
federal power overlap, like the sounds of woodwinds and strings in a single 
orchestra: what Schapiro calls “polyphonic” or “interactive” federalism.51  
In this view, the state and federal governments each operate 
simultaneously on the same subject matter as the other, not within separate 
spheres of substantive jurisdiction.  Geography, Schapiro maintains, not 
regulatory field, distinguishes state from federal power.52  Given states’ 
overlapping authority with national institutions, Schapiro brilliantly 
observes that when state law differs from national law (as when state high 
courts offer independent interpretations of state constitutional provisions 
textually identical to federal provisions), the result serves as resistance to 
                                                                                                                          
47 See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 231–32 (“[S]tate government power is allocated and deployed 
not only to ensure good internal self-governance on the state level, but also to ensure the success of the 
larger federal system of which state government is a part.”). 
48 See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 
389, 398 (1998) (rejecting existing state norms as a valid basis for independent state constitutional 
interpretation). 
49 See id. at 394 (“Rather than relying on vague generalities about state character, judges can turn 
their attention to the State Constitution itself . . . .”). 
50 See id. 
51 See SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 6, at 92–95; Schapiro, Interactive 
Federalism, supra note 6, at 285–86 (2005). 
52 See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 6, at 285 (“The scope of this political 
authority is defined by territory, not by subject matter.”). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court.53  A state’s divergent view of a constitutional 
right can illustrate an alternative legal world, thereby demonstrating for 
officials and citizens alike that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks the final, 
definitive, jurispathic word.54 
Like Gardner and Schapiro, Paul Kahn rejects states as autonomous 
nomoi.55  Kahn explains state constitutionalism by emphasizing that state 
constitutions are situated in a federal structure and therefore always exist in 
a national context.56  The role of state high courts in interpreting their 
constitutions independently from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
“accords with a longstanding justification of federalism,” Professor Kahn 
says, “under which state governments provide a forum for discussion, 
disagreement, and opposition to actions of the national government.”57  
Reflecting his view that state constitutional interpretation is really about 
discovering the meaning of a naturalistic “American” constitution, Kahn 
admires Thomas Cooley’s 1878 treatise on state constitutionalism because 
it treated the whole field as a single interpretive project across states, rather 
than as a series of unique state texts.58  For Kahn, the reduction of 
American constitutional discourse to the holdings of the federal Supreme 
Court represents a massive social failure; he therefore calls for a renewed 
interpretive debate over fundamental values in Congress, in law schools, 
and particularly in the state high courts.59 
The consensus of these state constitutional theorists, then, is that state 
high courts can and do serve as sites of contestation over deep national 
values.  Given their capacity to insulate state constitutional holdings from 
U.S. Supreme Court review, state high courts enjoy a special power to 
resist the Supreme Court’s tendency to shrink the national constitutional 
imagination. 
IV.  CAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS WORK AS FEDERAL 
DEMOSPRUDENTIAL DISSENTS? 
As noted above, adherents to the contemporary demosprudence school 
of thought focus exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court as the judicial 
institution capable of inspiring democratic action (and thereby earning 
democratic legitimacy).  Interestingly, anthropologist Sally Engle Merry 
                                                                                                                          
53 See id. at 288–90 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), as one such example). 
54 See id. at 289 (noting that state law can serve as an inspiring rebuke to federal jurisprudence). 
55 See Kahn, supra note 4, at 1148 (“The diversity of state courts is best understood as a diversity 
of interpretive bodies, not as a multiplicity of representatives of distinct sovereigns.”). 
56 See id. at 1166 (arguing that state courts should view their constitutions in light of “American 
constitutionalism”). 
57 Id. 
58 See id. at 1162–63; see generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
(4th ed. 1878). 
59 See Kahn, supra note 4, at 1155 (arguing that democracy depends on a rich constitutional 
discourse expressive of more than a single institution’s constitutional view). 
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found trial-level courts and officials to be profoundly influential in 
inspiring new popular understandings of legally contested values.  She 
noted that trial courtrooms are the scenes of performances, which “allow 
authoritative judicial and prosecutorial figures to interpret everyday life in 
new ways.”60  Professor Merry’s research suggests the potential power of 
courts—other than the U.S. Supreme Court—to foster democratic 
deliberation.  This section asks whether state high court constitutional 
decisions might share some part of the demosprudential potential of U.S. 
Supreme Court dissents. 
By posing this question, I do not intend to consider state constitutional 
dissents, though those judicial writings might well be concerned with the 
contestation and negotiation of national values.  In part, this Essay adopts 
this approach because a state high court that gives its state constitution a 
meaning different from federal jurisprudence already acts as a minority 
voice; the state court already rejects the federal holding (although possibly 
not for the same reasons as dissenting federal Justices).  State court 
dissents then fill the role of defending the conception of national values 
explained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion, and so become 
apologia for the federally-declared law rather than writings of 
jurisgenerative potential.  Nor does this Essay intend to review state high 
court decisions of federal constitutional law.  For one thing, an essay 
asking whether state court determinations of federal law might plausibly be 
viewed as about federal law would not likely be interesting, even to legal 
academics.  For another, such decisions fall unambiguously under the 
authoritative control of the U.S. Supreme Court,61 and although state courts 
might use the opportunity to critique federal jurisprudence, the U.S. 
Supreme Court can sap the potency of any judicial back-talk with a binding 
reversal.  Finally, my interest here lies in the capacity of state 
constitutional decisions to inspire a national political response from 
ordinary people.  State constitutional decisions can, and certainly do, 
provoke the sort of democratic backlash described by Post and Siegel 
within the affected state.62  This Essay’s query, which links for the first 
time the exciting recent developments in demosprudence theory and 
interactive federalism, asks whether the opinions of state high court 
majorities interpreting state constitutions might function as federal 
constitutional demosprudential dissents. 
This inquiry invites three questions.  First, are state high courts really 
                                                                                                                          
60 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI‘I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 261 (2000). 
61 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038–41 (1983) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court 
may review state court decisions of mixed state and federal law in the absence of a clear statement that 
the state disposition is independently supported by state law). 
62 See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009) (acknowledging that a popular 
initiative, Proposition 8, had amended the state constitution to supersede the holding of a state court 
constitutional decision); see also Reed, supra note 36, at  887–89 (describing the “democratic 
penetration” into state constitutional interpretation). 
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talking about the same thing as the U.S. Supreme Court when they 
interpret state constitutional provisions differently from the matching 
federal constitutional provisions?  In other words, can state constitutional 
decisions really function as a species of national constitutional law?  
Second, if state constitutionalism is indeed at least potentially a 
commentary on federal constitutionalism, can a state constitutional 
majority opinion function as a dissent, which by definition lacks the force 
of law?  And finally, can state constitutional decisions meet the 
democracy-enhancing criteria described in demosprudence theory?  The 
remainder of this Essay suggests that the answer to each of these questions 
might be “yes.” 
A.  Can State Constitutional Decisions Work as Federal 
Constitutionalism? 
To start, one must remember that the more common technique of state 
constitutional interpretation is not divergence from federal precedent, but 
near-obsequious adherence to it.63  From the practical perspective of state 
courts, then, and for better or for worse, state constitutionalism is already 
driven largely by federal doctrine and federal values.64 
The work on interactive federalism by Gardner, Schapiro, and Kahn 
described above further demonstrates that even “independent” state 
constitutional interpretation is best understood as intimately bound to 
federal constitutionalism.  Because state citizens’ political identity is tied 
to the national, rather than state, community,65 even state judges who 
attempt to read the character of their state for purposes of autonomous 
constitutional interpretation will end up finding a national nomos.  As Post 
and Siegel remind us, open-ended constitutional provisions like those 
protecting liberty and equality invite courts to express national values.66  
These open-ended provisions in state constitutions extend the same 
invitation.  In the political practices of ordinary people, we see “a social 
consensus that fundamental values in this country will be debated and 
resolved on a national level.”67 
If state constitutional interpreters are really engaged in construing a set 
                                                                                                                          
63 See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 6, at 290–91 (noting that state high courts 
usually interpret state constitutional provisions by simply adopting U.S. Supreme Court reasoning and 
results). 
64 See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case 
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1502 (2005) (noting that 
state courts interpreting state constitutions follow federal jurisprudence in the “clear majority” of 
cases). 
65 See Cover, supra note 15, at 48–49 (observing that “by the mid-twentieth century the states had 
long since lost their character as political communities”). 
66 See Post & Siegel, supra note 32, at 378–79 (relating national nomos to the judicial 
interpretation of deep constitutional debates). 
67 James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 828 
(1992). 
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of national constitutional values, as described here, then an important 
challenge is why the U.S. Supreme Court should lack the authority to 
impose its final interpretation on these values.68  Regardless of any “plain 
statement”69 they might make, why should state courts be permitted to 
diverge from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of national 
constitutional requirements if their state constitutional clauses are merely 
alternative articulations of those same national values?  Robert Williams 
has argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern for federalism, a 
concern that seeps into even ordinary individual-rights cases, renders the 
federal precedents inadequate to teach state high courts what the 
underlying values ought to be when the filter of federalism is removed.70 
Gardner’s functional theory and Schapiro’s interactive federalism, 
which both argue for a self-consciously federalist approach to state 
constitutional interpretation, derive their legitimacy from the federal 
Constitution itself, which carves out from federal oversight the legal space 
in which state constitutions operate.71  This constitutional space leads to an 
important consequence.  Both the public and legal elites typically believe 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has the last word on the meaning of 
constitutional liberty and equality.72  Even the Court itself thinks so.73  But 
this is false.74 
From the perspective of the ordinary person, state constitutional 
interpretation of liberty and equality often offers the last word.  To the cop 
on the beat concerned with executing a lawful search and seizure, the 
union organizer wishing to distribute petitions in the shopping mall, or the 
speeding motorist seeking to contest her ticket before a jury, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s determination of these rights under the federal 
Constitution’s text is the starting point, not the ending point, for analysis.75  
The law that actually applies, the word that bears the threat of violence, is 
the state court’s state constitutional interpretation.  If the police officer 
searches a car without a warrant because federal constitutional doctrine so 
permits, she will still have done wrong if the state constitutional court has 
                                                                                                                          
68 I am grateful to Rick Kay for raising this point. 
69 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (declaring that the U.S. Supreme Court will 
treat state high courts’ constitutional decisions as presumptively federal unless the state court opinion 
includes a “plain statement” that the decision rests on state constitutional law). 
70 See Williams, supra note 11, at 389–90 (noting how the U.S. Supreme Court seems constrained 
by federalism concerns inapplicable to the states). 
71 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 97. 
72 See Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell 
Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 954–55 (2009). 
73 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
74 Cf. Mazzone, supra note 23 (noting how the U.S. Supreme Court has, for practical purposes, 
surrendered much of its interpretive authority over the federal Constitution to state courts). 
75 See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (cataloging state constitutional protection of 
equality and liberty above the federal floor). 
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protected the privacy of citizens’ cars.  If the mall manager expels the 
pamphleteer because the Supreme Court has declined to find free speech 
protection against private parties, the expulsion will still be unlawful if the 
state constitution offers a stronger protection of free expression. 
Of course, perhaps a particular state high court has not protected the 
liberty or equality claim at question beyond the protection offered by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  But that conclusion reflects the state high court’s 
agreement with the Supreme Court majority’s view of the disputed rights, 
not a lack of power in the state court to disagree.  Thus, the final, 
authoritative judicial declaration of how much rights protection individual 
citizens actually receive commonly depends on state constitutional 
interpretation.76 
This means that any popular discontent with judicial rights 
protection“Why, there oughta be a law!”might be targeted at federal 
institutions and articulated in federal terms,77 but reflects a (perhaps 
unwitting) response to state constitutionalism.  The speeder wishing to 
contest her ticket before a jury but told she lacks the right to do so might 
complain about an inadequate Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, but it 
is also the state constitution that did not protect her right (although it could 
have).  If the speeder is truly exercised, she might initiate democratic 
debate leading to a change in the federal understanding of jury-trial rights.  
But that national result was caused, in part, by the state high court’s 
interpretation of the state constitution.  As Gardner eloquently observes, 
“My welfare, in other words, depends not only on our shared national 
Constitution and on my state constitution, but also to some extent on your 
state constitution as well.”78  State constitutions form a front-line part of 
the overall American constitutional net protecting liberty and equality.  It 
would seem both fair and accurate, then, to suggest that state constitutional 
decisions form part of the ongoing federal constitutional interpretive 
project. 
B.  Can State Constitutional Decisions Work as Federal Dissents? 
State constitutional majority decisions are law.  They mediate, 
legitimize, and mobilize real violence against human beings.79  Dissents, 
on the other hand, do not.  A dissent is a “story,” an emotional outburst or 
                                                                                                                          
76 The state constitution might be interpreted to be less protective than the federal Constitution, 
but it would then have the same practical effect as if it had the same level of protection, because federal 
law is supreme. 
77 See, e.g., Area Man Passionate Defender of What He Imagines Constitution To Be, ONION, 
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.theonion.com/content/news/area_man_passionate_defender_of (satirically 
illustrating the cultural prominence of the federal Constitution). 
78 GARDNER, supra note 5, at 122. 
79 See Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1606 (1986) 
(identifying the use or threat of violence as essential to the distinction between law and literature). 
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an attempt to persuade, but powerless to “announce[] . . . new law.”80  
How, then, could a decision be a dissent?  To begin to resolve that 
paradox, this Essay first considers why any judge might take the trouble to 
pen a dissent. 
Standard explanations for dissenting might envision the dissent as 
motivated by an attempt to persuade a future Supreme Court to reverse 
course or an effort to gain political capital for the dissenter against the 
other Justices for use in future disputes.81  Demosprudence, as seen 
already, explains some dissents as an attempt to inspire democratic 
action.82  Additionally, Justice Brennan once suggested that one reason for 
a federal Justice to dissent lies in the dissent’s potential to persuade a state 
high court to adopt the dissenter’s rationale as a matter of state 
constitutional law.83  Could state constitutional decisions, in turn, influence 
the interpretative strategies of national institutions, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court?  Recent empirical work suggests that “[f]rom due process 
to equal protection, from the First Amendment to the Fourth and Sixth, the 
[U.S.] Supreme Court routinelyand explicitlybases constitutional 
protection on whether a majority of states agree with it.”84 
State constitutional decisions, although binding in the state where 
issued, are merely persuasive everywhere else.  They do not impose the 
state judges’ views on the national polity.  In this way, state constitutional 
decisions are simultaneously law and not-law, depending on one’s 
territorial vantage point.  The generic reasons for dissenting might also 
help motivate a state high court to adopt an independent state constitutional 
analysis.  For example, just as a Justice might use a dissent to convince her 
colleagues that future disagreements might provoke future dissents, so a 
prior independent state constitutional interpretation might serve as a signal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court that the state high court is willing to reject 
federal doctrine again in the future.85 
To the extent they find federal constitutional jurisprudence 
unpersuasive—which is frequently the case when a state court construes its 
state constitution beyond the federal floor—state high courts implicitly or 
explicitly criticize the U.S. Supreme Court.  Doing so might come at some 
cost to norms of collegiality and respect, just as dissenting from within the 
                                                                                                                          
80 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 48–49. 
81 See Johnson et al., supra note 17, at 1568–69 (describing reasons to dissent). 
82 See Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 15, at 544–45. 
83 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, In Defense of 
Dissents, Third Annual Matthew O. Tobriner Memorial Lecture at the University of California, 
Hastings College of Law (Nov. 18, 1985), in 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986). 
84 Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
85 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992) (justifying a state 
constitutional interpretation at odds with federal doctrine by reference to an earlier independent state 
constitutional interpretation). 
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Court does,86 so one might not be surprised to find autonomous state 
constitutionalism practiced only intermittently.87  Nevertheless, the state 
judges might be motivated to pay that cost by a desire to change future 
federal doctrine, to gain credibility vis-à-vis the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
to inspire public political action.  The following review of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sheff and the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision 
in Varnum suggests that the functions of a dissent do indeed underlie these 
state courts’ independent constitutional interpretation. 
C.  Can State Constitutional Decisions Meet the Demosprudence Criteria? 
Guinier proposes a three-part definition of the demosprudential dissent.  
First, the dissent must be centrally concerned with an “issue of 
democracy”; second, the writing must be easily comprehensible to ordinary 
people outside of the legal elite; and, finally, the dissent must “appear[] to 
inspire nonjudicial actors to participate in some form of collective problem 
solving.”88  Notably, on their face, none of these criteria are exclusively 
limited to U.S. Supreme Court dissents.  If an independent state 
constitutional decision deals with issues of liberty, equality, or basic 
governmental structure, is written in plain terms, and seems to target 
ordinary people to deliberate democratically, then the decision would seem 
to satisfy the core characteristics of a demosprudential dissent.  To test 
whether state constitutional decisions can sometimes meet these criteria, 
this Essay now turns to actual examples of independent state 
constitutionalism. 
V.  SHEFF V. O’NEILL AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted an 
increasingly hostile view toward desegregation and education rights.  In 
cases like San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, holding 
that a Texas school financing system that disadvantaged poor schools did 
not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause,89 and Milliken v. Bradley, 
holding that remedial orders for de jure segregation must be confined to 
the district found to have segregated rather than directed toward a regional 
solution,90 the U.S. Supreme Court clearly signaled its impatience to end 
federal court efforts to reverse racial isolation in public schools.  The 
Court’s distaste for ongoing supervision of school desegregation continued 
                                                                                                                          
86 See Johnson et al., supra note 17, at 1570 (establishing empirically the significance of 
collegiality as a motivation to dissent or not). 
87 See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 42 (2006) (noting 
the phenomenon of inconsistently independent state constitutional interpretation). 
88 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 16. 
89 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41, 54–55 (1973). 
90 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974). 
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with cases like Allen v. Wright.91  There, parents of black schoolchildren 
sued to compel the Internal Revenue Service to enforce anti-discrimination 
rules against all-white (yet purportedly tax-exempt) private schools, but the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.92 
These cases certainly gave civil rights lawyers (and the children they 
represented) good reason to feel discouraged.  Early lawsuits in federal 
court designed to repair the racial isolation in inner-city schools were 
dropped when Milliken made plain that the federal Constitution could not 
support inter-district desegregation.93  Yet, rather than accept the Supreme 
Court’s normative vision of a color-blind Constitution upholding a 
radically racist education system, civil rights lawyers looked for alternative 
spaces in which they could contest the federal Court’s proffered nomos.  
Specifically, they turned to state constitutionalism.94 
In April 1989, lawyers from a host of state and national civil rights 
organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) 
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (“LDF”), filed a 
complaint in Connecticut Superior Court seeking a declaration that the 
isolation of racial minorities in the Hartford Public Schools breached the 
state’s constitutional obligation to provide equal educational opportunity.95  
Unlike conventional school desegregation cases at the time, the plaintiffs 
did not raise federal constitutional claims because they alleged only de 
facto segregation, not the de jure segregation the U.S. Supreme Court had 
come to require before finding a constitutional violation.96  The plaintiffs’ 
efforts would be vindicated, in 1996, by the Connecticut Supreme Court 
decision in Sheff v. O’Neill.97 
In shifting from federal to state constitutional litigation, lawyers like 
John Brittain of the Sheff plaintiffs’ team were not expressing an epiphany 
that Connecticut values, rather than American values, would provide the 
moral girding necessary for constitutionalized desegregation.  To the 
contrary, these legal elitesthe cream of the national civil rights 
                                                                                                                          
91 468 U.S. 737, 757–58 (1984) (holding that the claimed injury of diminished education to 
children was not fairly traceable to the government conduct alleged to be unlawful). 
92 See id. at 739–40. 
93 See SUSAN B. EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL 80–81 
(2006) (describing Hartford-area school desegregation cases filed in federal court but rejected upon 
application of Milliken); George Judson, Civil Rights Lawyers Hope to Use Hartford Schools Case as a 
Model, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at B1 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-integrationist 
decision in Milliken led to the failure of Hartford school desegregation cases filed in federal court). 
94 See Peter D. Enrich, Race and Money, Courts and Schools: Tentative Lessons from 
Connecticut, 36 IND. L. REV. 523, 524–25 (2003) (noting that education reform advocates turned 
toward state constitutional litigation to advance public school integration after U.S. Supreme Court 
retrenchment in the 1970s). 
95 See EATON, supra note 93, at 93, 111–12 (describing the story behind the filing of Sheff). 
96 See Charlotte Libov, State Readies Court Reply to Desegregation Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
1989, at 12CN1 (describing the gravamen of the Sheff complaint). 
97 678 A.2d 1267, 1270–71 (Conn. 1996).  For a previous study of this case, see Justin R. Long, 
Comment, Enforcing Affirmative State Constitutional Obligations and Sheff v. O’Neill, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 277 (2002). 
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barpersisted in their belief that the federal Constitution should have been 
construed to protect equal educational opportunity; state constitutional 
litigation was the lawyers’ solution to evade the restrictive federal 
precedents while still offering school children across the country a 
constitutional remedy.98  After all, the racial isolation in Hartfordwhere 
over ninety percent of the students were black or Latino, contrasted with 
the suburbs, where over ninety percent of the students were white99was a 
small part of a nationwide pattern that persists today.  In American public 
schools, most black children have been assigned to mostly minority 
schools; there has never been a single year where our schools were more 
integrated than that.100  Funding for the Sheff plaintiffs from the ACLU and 
the LDF would hardly have been forthcoming if those national 
organizations did not see the case as a role model of national significance.  
The Sheff complaint thus illustrates the practical role of state 
constitutionalism as an alternative site to contest American constitutional 
values and reiterates the potential of state constitutionalism to stand as a 
counterweight to the U.S. Supreme Court’s perceived role as final arbiter 
of constitutional values. 
One might appropriately see the origins of the Sheff complaint as 
support for the interactive federalism theory: state constitutionalism as 
commentary on national constitutional values.  But does the state high 
court’s opinion in Sheff satisfy Guinier’s criteria for demosprudence? 
First, demosprudence requires the case to be about an “issue of 
democracy.”101  School desegregation, the issue in Sheff, unequivocally 
fits.  As a recent student commentator records, training for the 
responsibilities of democratic citizenship has always been a prominent 
purpose of public education in this country.102  Education philosopher Amy 
Gutmann has written comprehensively on the mutually affirming 
importance of public education and democratic citizenship.103  And the 
Sheff court itself acknowledged the close relationship between educational 
equity and the success of American democracy.104  Issues of race and 
children are also culturally powerful and controversial, and so likely to 
strike ordinary Americans as foundational in a way that other issues might 
not. 
Second, a demosprudential opinion is written in a rhetorical style that 
                                                                                                                          
98 See EATON, supra note 93, at 112. 
99 See Libov, supra note 96 (providing racial balance statistics). 
100 See PETER IRONS, JIM CROW’S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 
338 (Viking 2002) (describing the national failure to integrate public schools). 
101 See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 16. 
102 See Donnelly, supra note 72, at 964–65. 
103 See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 139–48 (1999) (describing the undemocratic 
nature of unequal educational opportunity). 
104 See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996) (“It is crucial for a democratic society 
to provide all of its schoolchildren with fair access to an unsegregated education.”). 
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avoids legal jargon and is within the reading comprehension of ordinary 
people.  Parts, but not all, of the Sheff decision satisfy this criterion.  “The 
public elementary and high school students in Hartford suffer daily from 
the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as poverty, 
have had on their education,” wrote Chief Justice Ellen Peters for the Sheff 
court.105  In words surely everyone could understand, the court announced 
its disposition:  “We hold today that the needy schoolchildren of Hartford 
have waited long enough.”106  Although the court declined to issue an 
injunction or other remedy beyond its declaratory judgment, it explained 
the urgency behind its holding, reminding readers that “[f]inding a way to 
cross the racial and ethnic divide has never been more important than it is 
today.”107  These phrases are both simple and powerful.  They appear in the 
Connecticut Reports, but they would not be tonally out of place in a 
newspaper editorial or on a television talk show.  The rhetoric appeals to 
emotions and values as much as to cold legal logic.  In this sense, Sheff 
exhibits the second feature of a demosprudential opinion. 
Finally, demosprudence requires the judicial writing to target people 
outside of the legal elite for inspiration toward democratic change.  Some 
features of the decision do seem self-consciously outward-looking in this 
fashion.  In introducing the case, for example, the court noted that the 
complaint “raises questions that are difficult; the answers that we give are 
controversial.  We are, however, persuaded that a fair reading of the text 
and history of [the state constitution] . . . [demands a public school system 
that] provides Connecticut schoolchildren with a substantially equal 
educational opportunity.”108  These lines seem like an attempt to forestall a 
backlash; it is as if the court is saying that it knows many people will not 
like its decision, but that the public should trust the court’s sincerity and 
wisdom.  As Post and Siegel have taught us, backlashes are themselves 
instances of democratic engagement with constitutionalism,109 and so for 
the Sheff court to attempt to calm citizens who might otherwise be tempted 
to engage in popular sovereignty logically implies that the court is 
speaking to ordinary people outside the legal elite.  The remedial portion of 
Sheff, though, is the most clearly outward-looking component of the 
opinion.  Chief Justice Peters wrote: 
In staying our hand, we do not wish to be 
misunderstood. . . . Every passing day shortchanges these 
children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own 
well-being and to that of this state and nation.  We direct the 
legislature and the executive branch to put the search for 
                                                                                                                          
105 Id. at 1270. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1290. 
108 Id. at 1280. 
109 See Post & Siegel, supra note 32, at 390. 
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appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective 
agendas.  We are confident that with energy and good will, 
appropriate remedies can be found and implemented in time 
to make a difference before another generation of children 
suffers the consequences of a segregated public school 
education.110 
In this passage, the court is speaking to the public and to public 
officials quite explicitly, in both tone and substance.  In that sense, the 
opinion seeks to engage ordinary people and inspire them toward political 
action, and so satisfies the third element of a demosprudential opinion.  
Indeed, Sheff has inspired much political debate in Connecticut (though 
disappointingly little action).111 
The true test of whether a state constitutional opinion can be a federal 
constitutional demosprudential dissent, however, presumably cannot rest 
on inspiring local political action.112  Evidence that Sheff inspired ordinary 
people or political leaders to reconsider or debate national values would go 
further toward establishing the demosprudential potential of state 
constitutional opinions.  As it happens, some evidence of that type does 
exist.  For example, one of Connecticut’s U.S. Senators referred to Sheff by 
name in an address in favor of education reform on the Senate floor.113  An 
editorial in the Christian Science Monitor, a national newspaper, praised 
Sheff and situated the case unambiguously in the national struggle for 
educational equity, arguing that “[c]ourt decisions like that in Connecticut, 
though they offer no pat solutions, can at least keep us focused on the need 
to work together toward a more meaningful education for all America’s 
children.”114  And predictably, civil rights lawyers from other states were 
eager to learn from the Connecticut experience so as to seek similar 
progress from their own state courts.115 
On balance, the Sheff opinion seems to satisfy Guinier’s concept of a 
federal constitutional demosprudential dissent.  The case was brought to 
avoid giving the U.S. Supreme Court the final word in an area of law 
where it had declined to protect liberty and equality, and the state high 
court did indeed use its power to interpret the state constitution to reject the 
                                                                                                                          
110 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290. 
111 See Vanessa de la Torre, Sheff Backers Worry About State Budget, HARTFORD COURANT, June 
16, 2009, at A3 (quoting the co-chairman of the state legislature’s education committee urging support 
for increased education funding by asking the legislature to meet “‘its [still un-satisfied] legal and 
moral responsibilities’” under Sheff). 
112 But cf. Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 12 (describing a Louisville school official’s use of 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved to promote local political change). 
113 See 147 CONG. REC. S1271-02 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) 
(supporting an amendment to the Elementary & Secondary Education Act of 1965 by praising a 
Connecticut school’s response to Sheff). 
114 Editorial, Desegregation Dilemma, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 1996, at 20. 
115 See Judson, supra note 93 (describing contact between Sheff attorneys and civil rights lawyers 
in other states hoping to emulate Sheff in evading federal court retrenchment). 
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authority of unfavorable federal precedent.  The case was about a crucial 
problem confronting American democracy.  In addressing that problem, 
the court’s opinion speaks in emotional, moral tones to reach and inspire 
members of the general public.  And the opinion urges politicians and 
ordinary people to respond to its holding with democratic vigor, 
encouraging a popular debate about national constitutional values and 
prioritiesthe American nomos. 
VI.  VARNUM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Can the potential of state constitutional decisions to serve as federal 
constitutional demosprudential dissents find expression in cases other than 
Sheff?  The Iowa Supreme Court’s recent same-sex marriage decision, 
Varnum v. Brien,116 suggests that Sheff might not be just an outlier. 
First, although decided strictly on state constitutional grounds, Justice 
Cady’s decision in Varnum is entirely bereft of any suggestion that the 
justices would have decided the case differently if they were sitting on the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  The justices applied federal-style equal protection 
reasoning,117 they cited federal precedents,118 and they expressed a 
(unanimous) moral confidence that transcended text or jurisdiction.119  The 
Varnum court sought to effectuate the aspirational values of the state 
constitution, as Schapiro would encourage, but the values the court 
identified are national in scope and significance, as the court self-
consciously noted:  “The same-sex-marriage debate waged in this case is 
part of a strong national dialogue centered on a fundamental, deep-seated, 
traditional institution that has excluded, by state action, a particular class of 
Iowans.”120  Varnum, to its very core, is about national constitutional 
values. 
Furthermore, the decision proudly rejects U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the issue at bar, and in that sense works as a federal 
dissent, consistent with interactive federalism.  Some rejection is explicit, 
as where the court lists a series of Iowa constitutional decisions extending 
equality protections in advance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of 
                                                                                                                          
116 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
117 See id. at 879–80 (describing three tiers of equal protection review: rational basis, intermediate 
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny). 
118 See, e.g., id. at 880 (citing, among others, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217–18 (1982); United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–
33 (1996)); see also Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885–86 (“Although neither we nor the United States 
Supreme Court has decided which level of scrutiny applies to legislative classifications based on sexual 
orientation, numerous Supreme Court equal protection cases provide a general framework to guide our 
analysis under the Iowa Constitution.”). 
119 See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 890 (“Not surprisingly, none of the same-sex marriage decisions 
from other state courts around the nation have found a person’s sexual orientation to be indicative of 
the person's general ability to contribute to society.”). 
120 Id. at 878. 
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the same rights.121  Some rejection is stated only indirectly, as where the 
court uses federal constitutional terms of art but reaches a conclusion 
contrary to that of the federal government.122  And some rejection is 
entirely implicit, as where the court describes the same-sex marriage 
question as open under federal Supreme Court precedent,123 without 
addressing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision dismissing a same-sex 
marriage appeal “for want of [a] substantial federal question” in 1972.124  
In acting as a dissent from U.S. Supreme Court constitutional 
understandings, the Varnum decision fulfills the functionalist role of state 
constitutions described by Gardner; the court protects its citizens from at 
least some of the federal government’s intrusions on their right to equality.  
As Post and Siegel predicted, state constitutional same-sex marriage 
decisions serve as loci of contestation over national values and 
constitutional norms.125 
Just as Varnum seems to match interactive federalist notions of the role 
of state constitutionalism in checking the federal government and courts, 
so too the decision fits well with the criteria for a demosprudential dissent.  
As a case about marriage, a recognized “fundamental right” under the 
federal Constitution, the issue can reasonably be described as one 
concerning “democracy.”  With respect to tone and accessibility, few 
recent constitutional decisions of any American court could match the 
powerfully inclusive embrace inherent in these plain and gentle lines: 
This lawsuit is a civil rights action by twelve individuals who 
reside in six communities across Iowa.  Like most Iowans, 
they are responsible, caring, and productive individuals . . . . 
Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope to 
have children.  Some are foster parents.  Like all Iowans, they 
prize their liberties and live within the borders of this state 
with the expectation that their rights will be maintained and 
protecteda belief embraced by our state motto . . . . Each 
maintains a hope of getting married one day, an aspiration 
shared by many throughout Iowa.126 
The steady repetition of the plaintiffs’ commonalities with “most 
Iowans” speaks directly to common folk, reminding them of who they are 
and what sort of community they hope to maintain.  The court’s emotional, 
moral, and simply-phrased tone accomplishes nothing from a coldly 
                                                                                                                          
121 See id. at 877 (noting Iowa’s prescient rejection of the later-overturned federal holdings in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 
(1871), and others). 
122 See id. at 906 (“We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and lesbian people from the 
institution of civil marriage does not substantially further any important governmental objective.”). 
123 Id. at 878–79 n.6. 
124 See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972). 
125 See Post & Siegel, supra note 32, at 381–82. 
126 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872. 
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legalistic perspective, but it seems to attempt a reassurance for the ordinary 
reader that the court’s decision deserves respect. 
Varnum, along with other same-sex marriage cases on both sides of the 
issue, appears to have inspired a national debate by activists, politicians, 
and the public about the constitutional values the decision expresses.  
Activists and organizers for Lambda Legal, the national LGBTQ-rights 
organization whose lawyers won the decision in Varnum, also played a 
central role in the legal and political fights over same-sex marriage in 
California.127  Newspaper reports suggest that Varnum’s influence falls 
well beyond the Iowa cornfields; one California minister told a reporter he 
thought the decision would spark a popular backlash against “‘activist 
judges’ in general,” but a California gay-rights activist predicted to the 
same journalist that Iowa’s reputation as “Middle America” and “the 
heartland” would open more minds to the possibility of following 
Varnum.128  John Logan, a sociologist, agreed that Varnum’s origin in a 
rural, Midwest state could make same-sex marriage seem more “related to 
core American values” than similar decisions in the high courts of 
Massachusetts and California.129  Furthermore, state constitutional 
decisions like Varnum might already be increasing the political pressure on 
President Obama to expand federal rights for same-sex couples (a vivid 
example, if true, of how Gerald Rosenberg’s focus on quantifiable shifts in 
polling data might overlook more important aspects of deliberative 
democracy).130 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
State constitutional scholars, working over the last decade, have 
developed a rich set of theories to explain how state constitutional 
decisions can serve as a liberty-enhancing counterweight to U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions.  In focusing on the state-federal relationship, however, the 
scholarship on interactive federalism has paid little attention to the 
relationship of this judicial dialogue to deliberative democracy. 
On the other hand, the very recent development of demosprudence 
theory greatly advances our understanding of the connection between 
                                                                                                                          
127 See Lambda Legal, Varnum v. Brien, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/varnum-v-
brien.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2009); Lambda Legal, California, http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-
regions/california.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2009); see also John Schwartz, Ruling Upholds 
California’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1. 
128 Jessica Garrison & Maura Dolan, Iowa’s OK of Gay Marriage Could Bolster Prop. 8 Foes, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at A1. 
129 See Amy Lorentzen, Same-Sex Marriage Upheld in Iowa: State First in Nation’s Heartland to 
Join Massachusetts, Connecticut, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 4, 2009, at 3 (explaining that 
decisions in Massachusetts and California could be viewed as extremism on the coasts, rather than 
related to core American values). 
130 See Michael D. Shear, At White House, Obama Aims to Reassure Gays, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2009, at A1 (reporting that President Obama promised to work toward repeal of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act that prohibits federal recognition of same-sex marriages). 
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judicial and popular constructions of constitutional values.  But that 
scholarship overlooks almost entirely the extraordinary capacity of state 
constitutional decisions to offer an alternative site for legitimate 
contestation of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
This Essay has asked whether these two schools of thought might 
contribute to each other.  By studying two state constitutional opinions, it 
tested the idea that these types of decisions might sometimes work as 
demosprudential dissents.  Both Sheff v. O’Neill, the Connecticut school 
desegregation case, and Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa same-sex marriage 
case, appear to function both as examples of interactive federalism and as 
examples of demosprudential dissents.  Perhaps future scholarship will 
continue to espouse an integrated approach toward state constitutionalism 
and demosprudence theory. 
